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I think that wild love between two women is so totally incon-
ceivable that, to talk or write that in all its dimensions, one
almost has to rethink the world, to understand what it is that
happens to us. And we can rethink the world only through
word, 2
Lesbians,3 like other humans, express their love in kaleidoscopic ways: sex-
ual and nonsexual, grouped, coupled and solitary, and focus that love on adults,
children,4 animals, plants, and objects. However, when two lesbians embrace
the tradition of "romantic love" and begin to perceive themselves- and seek to
be perceived-as a "couple, ' 5 the lesbians are embracing a tradition that histori-
1. N. BROSSARD, LOVHERS (1986) (Godard trans. 1980).
* Associate Professor, CUNY Law School at Queen's College. LL.M., University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1990; J.D., Stetson University College of Law, 1979; B.A., Ramapo
College, 1976. The author appreciates the institutional and informal support of the Beatrice M. Bain
Research Group at the University of California, Berkeley, where she was an affiliated scholar during
1989-1990.
** J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 1989; M.L.I.S., Florida State University,
1985; B.A., Florida State University, 1981.
The authors wish to thank Mary Dunlap, Reva Siegel, and the staff at the Temple Law Review
for their helpful suggestions.
This article is part of a longer work of both a theoretical and practical nature entitled LESBIAN
LAW to be published by the feminist and lesbian publisher Firebrand Books.
2. N. BROSSARD, THE AERIAL LETrER 135-36 (1988) (Wildeman trans.).
3. The term "lesbian" throughout this article is used both as a noun and as an adjective, despite
recent sociological recommendations that sexual orientation is not the basis of identity and should
not be reified into a noun. See, eg., Risman & Pepper, Sociological Research on Male and Female
Homosexuality, 14 ANN. REV. Soc. 125 (1988) (authors suggest that term "homosexual" more ap-
propriately used as adjective rather than noun). This article employs the pragmatic approach of
Cheryl Clarke, who identifies "a woman as a lesbian who says she is." Clarke, Lesbianism: an Act of
Resistance, THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Moraga
& Anzaldua eds. 1981).
There are many postmodern definitions of lesbian focusing upon the fragility of the lesbian
identity. See, e.g., Stimpson, Afterword: Lesbian Studies in the 1990's, LESBIAN TEXTS AND CON-
TEXTS: RADICAL REvISIONS 380 (K. Jay & J. Glasgow eds. 1990) (" 'Lesbianism' might represent a
space in which we shape and reshape our psychosexual identities, in which we are metamorphic
creatures."). Such definitions, however, are not useful in the context of legal analysis.
4. This article limits its consideration of lesbians to those without children. For an excellent
discussion of the legal status of lesbian mothers, see Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, 78
GEO. L. J. 459 (1990).
5. Couple, partner(s), intimate partner(s), and lover(s) will be used synonymously in this work,
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cally does not include them. The heritage of "coupledom" '6 is a heterosexual
one; its ultimate institution is marriage. In secular societies, the state promotes
and protects the institution of marriage by regulating its boundaries and by de-
lineating the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of the individuals participating
in the institution.7
Whether or not lesbian or heterosexual couples experience coupledom in
similar or dissimilar ways, lesbian couples are relegated to an extra-legal rela-
tionship while heterosexual couples may seek state sanction of their relationship.
Gay male couples share this extra-legal status, and many observations in this
article may be useful in analyzing the consequences of gay male coupledom.
Unmarried heterosexuals may also have an extra-legal relationship, whether by
choice (perhaps based on political beliefs) or by exclusion (perhaps one of the
intimate partners is married to a third person), and many observations in this
article may likewise be useful in analyzing the status of unmarried heterosexuals.
Nevertheless, the focus of this article is exclusively lesbian and investigates les-
bian coupledom from the specific perspective of the development of a lesbian
legal theory.
The development of a lesbian legal theory is not intended as a paradigmatic
or prescriptive mechanism, but rather as a way to examine the laws affecting
lesbians from both individualistic and communitarian lesbian perspectives.8
Thus, this article is based on the assumption that lesbian interactions with the
legal system affect not only the individual lesbians involved, but also have reper-
cussions for other individual lesbians and for the lesbian community. The inclu-
sion of the lesbian community into the perspective of this work emphasizes the
political implications inherent in any interaction between the legal system and
lesbians. 9 While an encompassing definition of lesbian community is beyond the
scope of this work, it is a widely documented, if not easily definable,
phenomenon. 10
While lesbians are controlled by laws not of our choosing, we can and must
perhaps reflecting the often-heard lesbian lament that there is no proper term for participants in
lesbian affections.
The focus on couples does not represent an endorsement or preference of 'pairing' as the most
viable form of lesbian relationship.
6. While the word "coupledom" is awkward, it is used throughout this article to describe not
merely the fact of being part of a 'couple' but the ideology of coupling and pairing that permeates
heterosexual and lesbian notions of intimate relationships.
7. See infra notes 101-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state's power to regu-
late the institution of marriage.
8. Robson, Lesbian Jurisprudence?, 8 J. L. & INEQUALITY__(1990) (forthcoming) (poses ques-
tion of possibility of lesbian legal theory and advances possible principles).
9. The concept of community among lesbians recognizes that individual choices impact and
influence others' individual choices. In the legal system, the impact may be formally imposed by a
court applying the principle of "stare decisis."
10. See J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMO-
SEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 92-107 (1983) (exploration of evolution of
lesbian attachments and lesbians' unique struggles in departing from traditional female roles). See
generally S. PHELAN, IDENTITY POLITICS: LESBIAN FEMINISM AND THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY
(1989) (discussion of need for communitarian definition in reaction to identity problems faced by
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make choices about how to interact with the law. In order to make informed
choices which affect ourselves, our lovers, and our communities, it is necessary
to examine the practical and theoretical implications of lesbian coupledom
within the patriarchal legal system. I This article will make specific judgments
about the desirability of particular legal mechanisms from the perspective of
developing lesbian legal theory.
The suggestion that legal mechanisms should be or even could be analyzed
from a lesbian theoretical vantage point-and thus a lesbian legal theory devel-
oped-is disconcerting at first glance for several reasons. Lesbian theory has
been developed primarily as it pertains to action and interaction within the les-
bian community. 12 Lesbian theorist Joyce Trebilcot suggests principles that
may "contribute to the discovery/creation of consciously lesbian realities"' 3 and
visualizes these principles as applying only to lesbian intra-action:
Where the principles apply. My life is like a muddy lake with some
clear pools and rivulets-wimmin's spaces-but many areas thick, in
one degree or another with the silts and poisons of patriarchy. The
principles I articulate here belong to the clear waters. 14
Trebilcot, working within the lesbian separatist tradition, nevertheless articu-
lates the other major reason lesbian theory has not been directed at lesbian/non-
lesbian interactions-efficacy:
The principles are not intended to be used in situations that are
predominantly patriarchal, that is, when getting something from men
is at stake, as when one is working in the patriarchy for money, doing
business with men and male-identified women, etc. In these contexts I
find that it is usually most effective to operate according to patriarchal
ideals of knowledge and truth.15
This article, however, does not accept the notion that lesbians must necessarily
operate according to patriarchal principles within the patriarchal legal context.
Rather, this article seeks to delimit the circumference of "patriarchal legal con-
lesbians in gay community and in society in general); McCoy & Hicks, A Psychological Retrospective
on Power in the Contemporary Lesbian-Feminist Community, 4 FRONTIERS 66 (1979).
11. Patriarchy is a term that denotes the structural, systemic, and ideological arrangements
that determine women's oppression by men. For an expanded definition and numerous quotes, see A
FEMINIST DICTIONARY 323 (C. Kramarae & P. Treichler eds. 1985).
Hetero-patriarchy is a term preferred by many lesbians as it denotes the structural, systemic,
and ideological arrangements that determine women's oppression by men through heterosexuality.
12. For books that discuss lesbian theory in general, see, e.g., J. ALLEN, LESBIAN PHILOSOPHY:
EXPLORATIONS (1986); P. CRUIKSHANK, LESBIAN STUDIES (1982); S. HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETH-
Ics (1988); S. HOAGLAND & J. PENELOPE, FOR LESBIANS ONLY: A SEPARATIST ANTHOLOGY
(1989); Trebilcot, Dyke Methods or Principles for the Discovery/Creation of the Withstanding, 3 HY-
PATIA 1 (1989) (reprinted in LESBIAN PHILOSOPHIES AND CULTURES 15 (J. Allen ed. 1990)). Cf. A.
LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984) (writes as a "black feminist mother warrior poet" and seeks com-
plex connections within and between selves); A. RICH, BLOOD, BREAD AND POETRY: SELECTED
PROSE 1979-1985 (1986) (writes as a white antiracist Jewish lesbian poet and explores the "politics
of location" that emerge from specifics of individual lives).
13. Trebilcot, supra note 12, at 1.




text" by describing the colonization of lesbian relationships by patriarchal legal-
ism. 16 Finally, this article will evaluate the methods lesbians utilize when
interacting with the legal system, not to limit lesbian tactics, but to analyze the
consequences of those tactics and to begin to develop a lesbian legal theory.
Thus, this article will first consider the implications of the present extra-
legal status of lesbian relationships and the legal remedies currently available to
a lesbian couple who find themselves, as a couple, inadvertently involved in the
legal system. This article will then focus on a legal institution presently avail-
able to lesbians, that of contract, and on a legal institution presently not avail-
able to lesbians, that of marriage.
I. CONSEQUENCES AND CURES FOR THE EXTRA-LEGAL STATUS OF LESBIAN
COUPLES-POWERS OF ATTORNEY AND WILLS
then there is this obsession held by the overwhelming reality
(patriarchy at full gallop in our lives running after us as if on
the last hunt, a final assault on our bodies as women-loving
women, lesbians, suddenly forced to react, face to face with
reality). The confrontation must take place. 17
The daily ramifications of the extra-legal status of lesbian couples are decid-
edly circumstantial. Perhaps the couple discusses unobtainable benefits with re-
gard to income taxes, insurance, or other financial matters; or perhaps the
couple discusses immigration status.18 Or-increasingly-perhaps the couple
discusses the horrific specter raised by the situation of Sharon Kowalski and
Karen Thompson.
Kowalski and Thompson are lesbian lovers who, until November 1983,
lived a life not unlike many lesbian couples in the United States. 19 Their "life
partnership" is described by Karen Thompson "as similar to marriage."'20 They
had exchanged rings.2 1 They were buying a house together.2 2 Their extra-legal
"marriage," however, was disturbed by two devastating disasters.
16. We have settled on the metaphor "colonize" because it describes a process by which a
disempowered group internalizes the dominant ideas and opinions to such an extent that they be-
come identical to "common sense." See infra note 93 for sources relating to the philosophical and
social theoretical analysis of the concept of colonization.
17. N. BROSSARD, supra note 2, at 59.
18. See infra note 104 for a listing of the various ways in which a lesbian couple may be disad-
vantaged when compared with a married heterosexual couple.
19. K. THOMPSON & J. ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON KOWALSKI COME HOME? 1, 6,
25 (1988) [hereinafter K. THOMPSON].
This article adopts the statements by Thompson that the relationship is lesbian, and therefore
specifically disapproves of speculations that the relationship is nonlesbian. See, e.g., Recent Devel-
opments, Protecting the Nontraditional Couple in Time of Medical Crises, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J.
220, 220 n.3 (1989) [hereinafter Protecting the Nontraditional Couple] ("whether or not Kowalski
was engaged in a lesbian partnership remains in dispute").
20. K. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 25.
21. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1467 (1986).
22. K. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 15.
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On November 13, 1983, Sharon Kowalski's car was struck by a drunk
driver,23 leaving her with extensive physical and neurologic injuries. 24 In addi-
tion, this tragedy precipitated extensive legal proceedings which are still ongo-
ing. Karen Thompson petitioned for guardianship 25 and Sharon Kowalski's
parents immediately counter petitioned. The issue in conflict was the relation-
ship between Thompson and Kowalski. Kowalski's parents insisted that either
there was no such relationship,26 or that the existence of such a relationship was
detrimental.27 The lovers were kept apart for three and one-half years,28 con-
tributing to deterioration in Sharon Kowalski's health and an interruption of her
rehabilitation process. 29 The case attracted the attention not only of lesbian and
gay activists, but also of feminists and disability activists. 30
Karen Thompson and Sharon Kowalski were separated and kept apart be-
cause their legal relationship was analogous to that of strangers. While Thomp-
son's and Kowalski's particular circumstances might be unusual, they are
certainly not unique.31 Karen Thompson published her book in part to publi-
cize the case "and its ramifications for everyone's rights."132 In the appendix to
her book, Why Can't Sharon Kowalski Come Home?, Thompson advocates the
use of legal documentation, such as a durable power of attorney, to insure that
lesbian partners can remain involved in the financial and care-related decision-
making processes of their partners in case of accident or illness. 33 Thompson is
23. Id. at 1.
24. The injury left Kowalski with limited communication skills, Guardianship of Kowalski, 382
N.W.2d at 862-63, and technically in a coma for months after the accident, THOMPSON, supra note
19, at 21.
25. Thompson relates that she initiated guardianship proceedings after Sharon Kowalski's fa-
ther reacted negatively to the portrayal of his daughter as a lesbian in a letter written by Thompson
to the Kowalskis. K. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 28. In the letter, Thompson urged the parents to
allow Sharon Kowalski to stay in the St. Cloud area for treatment so that Kowalski could remain
near Thompson. Id.
26. The attorney for the parents of Sharon Kowalski labeled Thompson's claim that the two
women were lovers as "libelous, slanderous and defamatory." K. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 83.
27. For example, one doctor opined, "I feel that visits by Karen Thompson at this time would
expose Sharon Kowalski to a high risk of sexual abuse .... K. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 163
(quoting letter from William L. Wilson, M.D., to Jack Fena, attorney for parents of Sharon
Kowalski).
28. Bull, Thompson visits Kowalskil, Gay Community News, Feb. 12-18, 1989, at 1.
29. K. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 161.
30. Thompson and Kowalski were supported by a diverse group of public interest and special
interest organizations. These included groups formed expressly for Kowalski, such as local "Free
Sharon Kowalski" or "Bring Sharon Home" groups, as well as previously existent groups, such as
the Committee for Right to Recovery and Relationships (of Duluth, Mn.), National Organization
for Women, Metropolitan Community Church, Handicapped Organized Women, Minnesota Civil
Liberties Union, Nursing Home Action Group, United Handicapped Federation, Independent Liv-
ing Center, Center for the Independence of Disabled (New York) and Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund. K. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at Acknowledgements.
3 1. Because Thompson and Kowalski did not openly disclose their relationship to the public or
to friends (that is, they were "closeted"), almost no one could step forward to acknowledge the
relationship.
32. K. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 184.
33. Id. at Appendix B.
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not alone in suggesting that lesbian and other nontraditional couples make use
of durable powers of attorney to protect themselves in times of medical crisis.
34
A power of attorney is a document that authorizes one person to act as an
attorney in fact for another. Durable powers of attorney, unlike the traditional
power of attorney, do not terminate upon incapacity of the principal. 3 5 Thus, a
durable power of attorney is written authorization to an attorney in fact to per-
form specified acts on behalf of a principal. A durable power of attorney allows
one member of a lesbian couple to appoint her partner 36 as her attorney in fact,
thereby legally authorizing one partner to make certain decisions on the other
partner's behalf. These decisions include, but are not limited to: buying and
selling real estate and securities or other forms of property; depositing and with-
drawing money from checking and savings accounts; pledging the principal's
property as security; operating the principal's business; and providing for sup-
port and welfare of the principal's dependents. A durable power of attorney for
health care authorizes the attorney in fact to consent, refuse, or withdraw con-
sent to any care, treatment, service or procedure on or for the principal, limited
only by any restrictions written into the document itself.
Thus, durable powers of attorney may be used to delegate financial deci-
sions, health-related decisions, or both, depending on how the document is
drafted and on the applicable state statutes. 37 Several states specifically mandate
separate documents appointing durable powers of attorney for health care and
property decisions. 38 In addition, several books that are directed at lesbians and
gay men provide an introduction to the use of durable powers of attorney as well
as providing forms, advice, and guidance in making the decision of when and
34. For other works that provide a general discussion of the use of durable powers of attorney
by nontraditional couples to protect them in times of medical crisis, see, e.g., NATIONAL LAWYERS
GUILD, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, § 4.02 (R. Achtenberg, ed. 1989) [hereinafter
ACHTENBERG]; H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES: A
NOLO PRESS SELF-HELP LAW BOOK § 8 (5th ed. 1989) [hereinafter NOLO GUIDE]; Protecting the
Nontraditional Couple, supra note 19, at 229-3 1; Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treat-
ment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 985 (1984) [hereinafter Treatment Choices].
35. ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 4.07(2); Protecting the Nontraditional Couple, supra note
19, at 230; Treatment Choices, supra note 34, at 1015.
36. While anyone who meets the statutory requirements may be appointed as an attorney in
fact, it will be assumed that each intimate partner would seek to appoint the other.
37. One commentator states:
The potential scope of the powers of an attorney in fact is typically limited only by the
nondelegable acts doctrine. Conceivably, however, in some states the durable power of
attorney statute might operate as a screen, limiting the acts that may be performed under a
common law agency. In Wyoming for example, a durable power of attorney cannot be
used to convey property with a value in excess of $50,000, but a nondurable power of
attorney would be valid to make such a conveyance.
Treatment Choices, supra note 34, at 1015.
38. Treatment Choices, supra note 34, at 1022 n.231 (citing CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2430-2444
(West Supp. 1990) (sets forth right to appoint durable power of attorney for health care decisions);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501-2508 (1983) (right to appoint agent in connection with treatment
termination decisions); VA. CODE § 54.1-2981-2992 (1988) (right to make written declaration in-
structing physician to withhold life-prolonging treatment)).
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how to draft such documents.39 Finally, specific state statutes often provide
forms for powers of attorney in the text of the legislation.40
• A durable power of attorney, however, is not always an available option.
Some states limit who can be appointed as the attorney in fact in ways that
would certainly exclude lesbian partners, 4 1 or might possibly exclude lesbian
partners in particular situations.4 2 Further, a state may "limit the scope and
authority of the attorney in fact." 4
3
Even when a durable power of attorney is available statutorily, it may be
attacked by a homophobic family in much the same way as a will may be at-
tacked. 44 Family members might litigate specific decisions of an attorney in fact
as contrary to the best interests of the dependent. 4 5 Hostile relatives may also
attempt to subvert the attorney in fact's authority by seeking to have a guardian
named who is different from the person appointed by the durable power of attor-
ney. 46 In some states, the appointment of a guardian by the court automatically
terminates a durable power of attorney. 47 It has been noted, however, that:
a court has [a] duty to uphold the patient's constitutional and common
law interests in determining the course of [her] own medical care. The
patient's choice of an agent is an aspect of [her] choice of treatment,
and the clear trend of recent court decisions has been to respect past
competent expressions of treatment preference.
48
From the perspective of lesbian legal theory, it is important to note that the
purpose of a durable power of attorney is to insulate a lesbian couple from legal
rules which would otherwise be applicable in times of incapacity. Once in place,
a third party cannot use a durable power of attorney to force the attorney in fact
to act or not to act in a certain way. Further, a durable power of attorney can be
39. See supra note 34 for a list of sources that provide guidance on the drafting and use of
durable powers of attorney.
40. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2450 (West Supp. 1990) (form of power of attorney); CAL. CIv.
CODE § 2433 (form of warning to be appended to durable power of attorney in case of no legal
counsel); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501 (McKinney 1989) (statutory short form of general
power of attorney).
41. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West Supp. 1990) (limits attorney in fact to "spouse,
brother, sister, niece, nephew, or a person related to the principal by lineal consanguity... ").
42. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 2432.5 (excludes employees of treating health care facility from
being named attorney in fact to make health care decisions unless "the employee so designated is a
relative of the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption").
43. NOLO GUIDE, supra note 34, at § 8:10; Treatment Choices, supra note 34, at 1012 n.175.
44. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ways that a will might
be attacked by a homophobic family.
45. Treatment Choices, supra note 34, at 1006.
46. Id. at 1027.
47. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69(o) (West 1981) (power of attorney ceases at
appointment of conservator); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West 1988) (durable family power of attor-
ney temporarily suspended on appointment of guardian); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 386.093 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (attorney in fact shall terminate on appointment of fiduciary); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-5-501(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (power of attorney becomes inoperative when conservator ap-
pointed); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Vernon 1980) (powers of attorney terminate on qualifica-
tion of guardian).
48. Treatment Choices, supra note 34, at 1028.
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limited and tailored in its scope and authority by careful drafting. Absent statu-
tory requirements that limit the persons who can serve as attorneys in fact (e.g.,
blood relatives), a durable power of attorney or other power of attorney need not
denominate the relationship between the parties. A recitation of the loving na-
ture of the relationship, however, might be appropriate in a power of attorney if
the parties suspect that the nature of the relationship would be denied by hostile
third parties. In Kowalski's case, a durable power of attorney would have pro-
vided a document subverting the "natural right" of Sharon Kowalski's parents
over their adult daughter. A recitation of the relationship in a document signed
by Sharon Kowalski could have prevented people from reacting to Thompson's
disclosure as if Thompson were a "sick crazy person who has made up this
whole story."' 49 The preparation of the document or the disclosure of lesbianism
within it, however, still leaves open the possibility that the relationship will be
attacked as "sick." 50
Powers of attorney, durable or otherwise, do not survive the death of a
party. In order to provide protection and recognition to a surviving lover, a
lesbian must execute a will, a trust, or some other testamentary document. Tes-
tamentary documents, like powers of attorney, are individualistic and adaptable
documents which may displace the laws which otherwise nullify the lesbian rela-
tionship in favor of legally recognized relationships.
When a person dies without a will, the estate is distributed according to the
intestate succession laws of the resident state. While these statutes may vary
from state to state, "in all cases the heirs are limited to the legal spouse and
blood relatives of the decedent, and in some states, the relatives of a predeceased
legal spouse." 5' In order for a lesbian to bequeath anything to her partner or to
anyone outside her legally defined family, she must execute a will or trust. It is
well established that "[a]bsent a written instrument which is properly executed
by a person of the requisite capacity, the law gives no rights to persons unrelated
by kinship or legal marriage in matters concerning disposition of assets on
death."' 52 Alice B. Toklas, who the Stein family left virtually penniless after the
death of her lover Gertrude Stein, is an infamous example of a lesbian partner
who was left unprotected from the hostile family of a deceased lover. 53
Even a perfectly executed testamentary document is subject to legal attack
49. K. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 26 (reaction of Sharon Kowalski's parents as related by
their other daughter to Thompson after Thompson disclosed nature of her relationship with
Sharon).
50. See supra note 27 for an example of how a medical doctor characterized a continued rela-
tionship between Thompson and Kowalski as potentially detrimental to Kowalski.
51. ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 4.04.
52. Id. at § 4.02.
53. See L. SINON, THE BIOGRAPHY OF ALICE B. TOKLAS 247-50 (1977)); Rivera, Our Straight
Laced Judger" The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L. J.
799, 908 n.657 (1979) (social and legal policies designed to recognize needs of gay families lacking)
(citing S. STEWARD, DEAR SAMMY: LETTERS FROM GERTRUDE STEIN AND ALICE B. TOKLAS 107
(1977)). See also Michener, Ashes, in CROSSING THE MAINSTREAM 105 (Larson ed. 1987) (fictional




from disinherited relatives. Grounds for contest are generally limited to mental
incapacity, fraud, duress, and undue influence. 54 Hostile family members would
most likely challenge a will that bequeaths the bulk of an estate to a lesbian lover
on the ground of undue influence. To mount a successful challenge on these
grounds, a contestant must prove that the beneficiary exerted enough pressure
on the testator to destroy her free will. 55 Intervivos trusts are subject to similar
attacks. 56
In judging will contests, the probate court, as a court of equity, has broad
powers. Thus, judges have wide latitude to implement their particular versions
of fairness, despite strong precedent limiting the disruption of "testamentary dis-
position merely because it does not conform to their notions of fairness or pro-
priety." 57 This notion of preserving "testamentary disposition" or testamentary
intent is the cornerstone of probate law. A lesbian relationship alone is not suffi-
cient reason to disturb testamentary intent.58 Courts that have addressed undue
influence in the context of homosexual relationships, "look for evidence in the
relationship of the testator and beneficiary tending to show the beneficiary's con-
trol over the testator was sufficiently strong that the free will of the testator was
supplanted as a result." 59 While one commentator recently noted the impact of
judicial homophobia and concluded that "a homosexual testator who bequeaths
the bulk of his [sic] estate to his lover stands in greater risk of having his testa-
mentary plans overturned than does a [similarly situated] heterosexual testa-
tor," 6° contemporary judicial discourse indicates a more tolerant attitude.6 1
54. ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 4.04[8].
55. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 225, 227
(1981).
56. Sherman, supra note 55, at 265-66. See also Knowles v. Binford, 268 Md. 2, 298 A.2d. 862
(1973) (trust benefitting women's partner overturned as product of undue influence, not affection).
57. Sherman, supra note 55, at 228.
58. The "fact that one's beneficiary, agent or nominated conservator is also one's homosexual
lover is not a basis, in and of itself, for invalidating otherwise valid estate planning documents."
ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 4.02. See also BOWE & PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 29.92 (1961).
59. ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 4.04[8].
60. Sherman, supra note 55, at 267.
61. Three cases, all involving gay men, all concerning nonexistent or imperfect testamentary
documents, and all decided in traditionally conservative jurisdictions, are exemplars. In each case,
the court noted the homosexual nature of the relationship between the men and decided in favor of
the surviving lover.
In Weekes v. Gay, 243 Ga. 784, 256 S.E.2d 901 (1979), the court noted only that "the appellee
and decedent had lived together for six years in a homosexual relationship." IdL at 784, 256 S.E.2d
at 903. The court nevertheless imposed an implied trust to grant the home to the gay male lover
despite the fact that the deceased died intestate. Id. at 787, 256 S.E.2d at 904.
In Bramlett v. Selman, 268 Ark. 457, 597 S.W.2d 80 (1980), the court cited Weekes with ap-
proval, found the confidential relationship necessary to support a constructive trust, and stated that
"whether or not a confidential relationship exists depends upon the actual relationship between the
parties." Id. at 464, 597 S.W.2d at 84. The court opined that "all homosexual involvements are not
as a matter of law confidential relationships sufficient to support a constructive trust, but a court of
equity should not deny relief to a person merely because he is a homosexual." Id. at 465, 597 S.W.2d
at 85. In finding a confidential relationship, the court pointed to the fact that the two men had been
lovers for over a year and had lived together for much of that time. Id. at 464, 597 S.W.2d at 84.
In Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118, 1120 (La. Ct. App. 1987), the court upheld a ho-
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However, in addition to relying on the overdue expansion of probate judges'
sensibilities in the area of lesbian estate dispositions, there are technical safe-
guards that can improve the chances of a contested instrument to withstand
attack. 62 In the case of testamentary dispositions, as in the case of powers of
attorneys, the more legally sound the document, the more efficacious it will be.
Efficacy, however, is not the ultimate interest of a developing lesbian legal
theory. While short term practical benefits for specific lesbians are important,
this interest should not eclipse a more general notion of lesbian empowerment.
The relationship between efficacy-the realization of practical effects-and poli-
tics-the imagination of possible empowerment- is complicated. The difficulty
is best expressed by lesbian theorist Audre Lorde:
Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society's definition of
acceptable women; those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of
difference-those of us who are poor, who are lesbians, who are Black,
who are older-know that survival is not an academic skill. It is learn-
ing how to stand alone, unpopular and sometimes reviled, and how to
make common cause with those others identified as outside the struc-
tures in order to define and seek a world in which we can all flourish.
It is learning how to take our differences and make them strengths.
For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. They
may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will
never enable us to bring about genuine change. And this fact is only
threatening to those women who still define the master's house as their
only source of support. 6 3
Durable powers of attorney, wills, and similar documents are essentially
"tools" that may provide a measure of protection to the members of lesbian
couples who are attacked by outside parties such as family, recalcitrant health
care workers, and bureaucrats. Depending on how such documents are written,
they can both protect the individual wishes of lesbians or lesbian couples and
force the legal system to recognize and acknowledge lesbian relationships with-
out allowing the system to define those relationships. Additionally, these
"tools" are outer-directed, protecting lesbians by preventing the laws that would
otherwise govern from taking effect. Because of this limited, outer-directed im-
pact, these instruments belong to the class of "tools" Lorde describes as provid-
ing ephemeral or temporary relief. This restricted effect, however, does not in
and of itself render these instruments objectionable from a lesbian theoretical
lographic will of a gay male which read "I leave all to Danny." The court considered evidence of the
nine year relationship between the decedent and his partner which satisfied the Louisiana require-
ment that in the case of ambiguity the legacy be decreed to the legatee most intimately connected to
the decedent. Id at 1123-24.
62. These techniques include, but are not limited to, the use of an attorney familiar with the
problems facing lesbian testators, the preparation of detailed memoranda of the execution ceremony,
video taping of the execution, insertion of ad terrorem clauses, clarification of the intent of the testa-
tor or settlor in the documents to the point of redundancy, and the insertion of explicit disinheri-
tance clauses. ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 4.04[l]-[8]. See NOLO GUIDE, supra note 34, at
§ 9:4-9:19 (sets forth technical safeguards to protect testamentary intent of deceased); Protecting the
Nontraditional Couple, supra note 19, at 234 nn.85-86 (same).
63. A. LORDE, supra note 12, at 112 (emphasis supplied).
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perspective. Employing such "tools" can provide immense benefits to individual
lesbians and lesbian couples. Nevertheless, such employment should not be con-
fused with genuine change. Documents such as durable powers of attorney,
wills, trusts, and the designation of beneficiaries provide practical protection for
lesbian couples and limit the opportunity for nonlesbians to define lesbian rela-
tionships. But such "tools" are not intended to internally define the lesbian rela-
tionship. Such an internal definition, as in the case of contracts, poses a different
problem from a lesbian legal perspective.
II. CONTRACTS
patience and ardour we must constantly renew in order to
make it across the opaque city of the fathers, always on a tight-
rope, having to keep our balance, and all sides, the abyss. For
we work without nets. 64
A myriad of advisors to lesbian couples encourage the use of cohabi-
tation contracts: ones that are either meant to be specifically legally enforce-
able or ones that are written as an expression of commitment.6 5 Depending on
the type of contract, the jurisdiction, and the court, agreements between
lesbians may have to be expressly written,66 expressly oral,67 or be im-
64. N. BROSSARD, supra note 2, at 57.
65. See ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 2.02 (cohabitation agreements should always be in
writing, whether or not required by law, in order to express parties' intentions); D. CLUNIS & G.
GREEN, LESBIAN COUPLES 65 (1988) (contracts acknowledge daily living issues such as money,
sharing expenses, and future expectations and obligations); Engelhardt & Triantafillou, Mediation
for Lesbians, in LESBIAN PSYCHOLOGIES 327, 339 (Boston Lesbian Psychologies Collective ed. 1988)
(describes draftings of contracts from perspectives of lawyer and therapist); NOLO GUIDE, supra
note 34, at § 2:1-2:9 (recent changes in law allow unmarried couples to make contracts regarding
property rights, helps avoid costly and traumatic litigation); OUR RIGHT TO LOVE: A LESBIAN
RESOURCE BOOK 217 (G. Vida ed. 1978) (lesbian partners must make two contracts: one dealing
with financial and property arrangements and one dealing with personal matters) [hereinafter OUR
RIGHT]; C. WEST, A LESBIAN LOVE ADVISOR: THE SWEET AND SAVORY ARTS OF LESBIAN
COURTSHIP 104-05 (1989) (esbian couples should write "love and partnership accords") [hereinafter
LOVE ADVISOR].
66. In an unpublished decision, Richardson v. Conley, a superior court followed Marvin v.
Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), and recognized that a lesbian
relationship was sufficiently legitimate to require one party to pay support at the end of the relation-
ship. The decision was based in part on the existence of a signed agreement apportioning responsi-
bility for household and financial support between them. Note, Marital Status Classifications.
Protecting Homosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitors, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 137 n.159 (1986).
Both ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, and the authors of NOLO GUIDE, supra note 34, urge lesbians
who want their contracts to be legally enforceable to put them in writing. Both works provide
sample contracts and guidelines for preparation, and contain advice about the proper scope of such
documents, the meretricious service pitfalls, the necessity for attorney preparation, and other impor-
tant aspects of contract preparation. Anyone interested in the nuts and bolts of cohabitation con-
tracts for lesbians is encouraged to seek out either of these two works.
67. In Friedlander v. Solari, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1988, at 14, col. 2, a New York court enforced
an express oral agreement between two women who had lived together from 1969 to 1984. The
defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, one of which
was failure to set forth a legal theory on which relief could be granted. In finding for the plaintiff,
the court stated "[an implied contract to pay for services rendered between two people who have
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plied 68 to be legally enforceable. Some agreements may not be legally enforcea-
ble at all. 69 Because of a judge's power to find an implied contract-even if the
couple has not expressly documented their promises and agreements-contract
principles may enter a lesbian relationship unexpectedly. 70 In jurisdictions that
follow Marvin v. Marvin 7 1 and effectuate the "intent" of the parties, "conduct
may give rise to an implied contract completely at odds with the intent of one or
more of the parties; or unanticipated equitable relief may be granted contrary to
expectation. Thus, both parties may be surprised by the consequences of verbal
statements and nonverbal acts."' 72 While "most state courts actually faced with
the question of living-together contracts have enforced written ones, rejected
implied ones, and fallen somewhere below the middle with oral ones," 73 it is
readily apparent that contract law is having an impact on lesbian relationships.
Litigation based on some form of contract may be the only recourse avail-
able to a woman forced to protect property interests during the dissolution of a
lesbian partnership. Although preplanning with other documents, such as joint
tenancies or tenancies in common and dual titling of property, can supplant
lived together is unenforceable. However, an express oral agreement for payment may be enforced."
Id
68. See, eg., Small v. Harper, 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). In this appeal from a
summary judgment, the court reversed the entry of judgment. Id. at 30. Although the court used
the terms "an oral partnership" and "partnership," it is unclear from the portions of the depositions
appearing in the decision whether the two women had actually orally agreed to a myriad of financial
details or whether the court was implying a contract. The court found the nature of the relationship
relevant, emphasizing the following deposition testimony of the plaintiff:
I had always viewed our relationship just as a marriage, as both of us had. We both used
that word many times.
Q: You have said in your pleadings that the two of you formed a partnership for profit.
When did that take place?
A: A partnership for profit I presume would refer to the fact that we agreed that we would
live together, and that we would accumulate together; and always the goal at the end was a
comfortable retirement, and we were always talking about details of that.
Id at 26 (emphasis supplied).
69. See NOLO GUIDE, supra note 34, at § 2:3. ("Two states (Georgia and Illinois) outlaw
contracts between any unmarried couples.")
70. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). Michelle
Treolla Marvin sued actor Lee Marvin for breach of contract when the couple separated after living
together for seven years. It was Michelle Marvin's position that Lee Marvin had expressly promised
to support her financially if she gave up her career and took responsibility for the household. Id. at
666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819. The court found a cause of action for breach of contract
and further determined that implied contracts, implied partnerships, quantum meruit, and construc-
tive trusts can be used as a basis for granting relief where the situation warrants. Id. at 675, 689, 557
P.2d at 116, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825, 831. See also AcHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 3.04[2][a][i]:
The court set forth the standard that the reasonable expectations of the parties are primary.
The court states 'that the parties intend to deal fairly with each other' and that 'the judicial
barriers that may stand in the way of a policy based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable
expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship should be removed.'
Id.
71. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
72. ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 2.02.
73. NOLO GUIDE, supra note 34, at § 2:6.
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much of the need for contracts,74 not all types of property can be titled. For
other properties and for intangibles, the question of contract is still relevant.
Given the possibility that a relationship contract might be implied from
words or conduct and that litigation might occur, the most practical course of
conduct for an individual lesbian might be to consciously and deliberately nego-
tiate an enforceable written agreement. Such an agreement would be advanta-
geous from the couple's perspective because it could both address specific
concerns and provide for alternative dispute resolutions. However, even though
a deliberated document may serve the parties better than proceeding through the
litigation process, the contract form itself may be inherently unsuited for use in
formalizing the terms of a lesbian relationship.
In order to address relationship contracts in the context of the development
of a lesbian legal theory, it is necessary to make a critical examination of con-
tract ideology. Classical contract theory flows from the fiction of the original
contract in which the inhabitants of the state of nature exchanged the "insecuri-
ties of natural freedom for equal, civil freedom which is protected by the
state."' 75 Contracts create "rights" between the contracting parties, enforceable
by recourse to legal mechanisms. Critics of classical contract theory claim that
"the major function of contract law is ... [to] legitimate[ ] privilege through the
creation of neutral sounding apolitical 'rights.' "76 Privilege is maintained by
two basic myths, that of equality between those contracting and that of freedom
to choose to contract. 77 These myths mask the imbalance of power between
contracting parties by legally describing it "as a relationship between formally
equal contracting parties" no matter the actual economic or social positions be-
tween the two. 78 While there are principles within applied contract theory that
subvert this myth-such as unconscionability-the main tenet of contract the-
ory is a formalism that renders underlying conditions irrelevant if the formal
requirements of contract are satisfied.
The claim that contract ideology obscures-and thus perpetuates-dispari-
ties in social and economic power is relevant for the development of lesbian legal
theory, especially as the theory recognizes the diversity of lesbians. The contract
solution may obscure real social, economic, physical, and emotional differences
74. Preplanning through these mechanisms has been especially effective in the area of real es-
tate and for titled property such as automobiles, boats, mobile homes, bank accounts, and stocks and
bonds.
75. C. PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 2 (1988).
76. West, Pornography as a Legal Text, in FOR ADULT USERS ONLY: THE DILEMMA OF VIO-
LENT PORNOGRAPHY 114 (Gubar & Hoff eds. 1989) (discussing Critical Legal Studies).
77. See generally Gabel & Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAw-A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (discusses politics of Reagan era as based on "utopian
imagery of freedom of contract").
78. West, supra note 76, at 115. In addition, the myth of freedom to contract conceals that one
of the parties may be coerced by circumstance into "consenting" to the contract. "According to
contemporary contract theorists, social conditions are such that it is always reasonable for individu-
als to exercise their freedom and enter into the marriage contract or an employment contract or even
... a (civil) slave contract." C. PATEMAN, supra note 75, at 7. This article assumes that the lesbian
intimate relationship addressed is based on choice.
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between lesbians, which are manifested in complex and contradictory ways. 79 It
is not only patriarchal culture that exhibits an attraction for the myth of equal-
ity; the myth pervades lesbian culture as well. Further, the myth of equality
may never be more powerful than at the inception of coupledom,80 the very time
at which a relationship contract would be drafted. Thus, from a pragmatic per-
spective, the contract solution is flawed because it depends on the existence of
real, perceived, continuing, and absolute parity. The virtual nonexistence of ab-
solute parity between any two lesbians makes contract questionable from a les-
bian theoretical perspective.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the contract process confronts and ad-
dresses the lack of parity, the contract solution may be useful, especially from
the perspective of the historically 'disadvantaged.' 8 1 Just as Married Women's
79. One of many examples of the differences between lesbians is the diversity of their class
background and present class situation. Lesbian writer Chrystos recounts her own experience within
the context of overclass and underclass lesbian intimate partnerships thusly:
In breakups with over class women, money has often been the most bitter battle and I have
given in to ridiculous demands .... This bitterness about money and arguments I've had
with lovers over things (things I had brought into the relationships--curiously I have more
"things" than most middle class women who don't own houses, probably because I never
part with anything, another under class value) shames me deeply .... These are the raw
nerves under our mistrust of one another. The ex-lover has an uncle who owns a bank ....
None of my relatives even work in a bank .... When I try to fight about money with over
class lovers I've already lost and I know it. I can't be casual although I envy those who can
be.
Chrystos, Headaches and Ruminations,,17 Gay Community News 9, February 4-10, 1990.
Similarly, another lesbian theorist explains:
nonprivileged dykes are sometimes unable, and usually unwilling, to state their emotional
needs. We are therefore (conveniently, I can't resist noting) assumed to have none. So,
those accustomed to asking for things, do so; those who are unaccustomed to asking for
things don't. And the class system marches on.
Cardea, Lesbian Revolution and the 50 Minute Hour, in LESBIAN PHILOSOPHIES AND CULTURES,
supra note 12, at 193, 209-10.
For nonlesbian perspectives on how different cultural attitudes affect contract, see Wagatsuma
& Rosett, Cultural Attitudes Towards Contract Law: Japan and the United States Compared, 2
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 76, 91 (1983) (discusses Japanese notion of "wa" (group harmony) and
affect on actions of disputing parties who act as if there is no dispute); Mahoney, Contract and
Neighbourly Exchange Among the Birwa of Botswana, 21 J. AFRICAN L. 40, 63-65 (1977) (discusses
apparently unusual practice of enforceable executory contracts among tribal members (applied in
plowing context only)).
80. See generally D. CLUNIS & C. GREEN, supra note 65, at 14-17 (describing concepts of
"merging" and "fusion" that typify "romance" stage of lesbian relationships).
81. See Williams, Alchemical Notes" Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987) (provides example of different implications of contract in
terms of historic advantage not in context of relationship contracts). Patricia Williams describes the
disparate strategies employed by herself, a black female law professor, and Peter Gabel, a white male
law professor and one of the founders of the Critical Legal Studies movement. Although both
wanted to "enhance trust," Gabel rented an apartment with cash and no written documents, while
Williams signed "a detailed lengthily-negotiated, finely printed lease." Id. at 406-07. Williams ex-
plains the contrast:
I grew up in a neighborhood where landlords would not sign leases with their poor, black
tenants, and demanded that rent be paid in cash; although superficially resembling Peter's
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Property Acts improved the status of certain women by allowing them to par-
ticipate in contracts, 82 the ability to contract can empower specific lesbians. In
all cases, however, lesbian legal theory must confront the limitations and dan-
gers of contract ideology.
The dangers-if not the limitations--of contract theory are especially pro-
nounced when contract is used to organize nonlegal aspects of lesbian relation-
ships. The link between legal and extra-legal perspectives is often brought to the
forefront when lesbian couples write two contracts, one legally enforceable and
one a separate emotional document. 83 The emotional document, despite the in-
tent of the parties, can become a litigated contract. 84 Yet, even absent the risk
of unintended enforcement, the appropriateness of the concept of coupledom
through contract-a concept pervasive in lesbian literature-is questionable.
Many lesbian advisors advocate applying contract principles to all aspects
of life. For example, in Our Right to Love: A Lesbian Resource Book, the writers
in the portion entitled "Legal Planning for Loving Partnerships" claim that "we
all operate within our relationships on a contract. '8 5 Pat Califia, in a classic
book on lesbian sexuality stressing pluralism and nonconformity, nevertheless
suggests "when you form a relationship with another woman or other women,
think of the process as negotiating a contract rather than enforcing standards or
issuing ultimatums."' 86 And in a book described by the publisher as "the first
definitive guide for lesbians that deals with the pleasures and challenges of being
transaction, such "informality" in most white-on-black situations signals distrust, not trust
Peter, I would speculate, would say that a lease or any other formal mechanism would
introduce distrust into his relationships and that he would suffer alienation, leading to the
commodification of his being and the denigration of his person to property. In contrast,
the lack of a formal relation to the other would leave me estranged. It would risk a figura-
tive isolation from that creative commerce by which I may be recognized as whole, with
which I may feed and clothe and shelter myself, by which I may be seen as equal-even if I
am stranger. For me, stranger-stranger relations are better than stranger-chattel.
Id. at 408 (emphasis supplied).
82. There is an historic prohibition and regulation of women's right to contract. The Married
Women's Property Acts, which provided married women with the right to contract were enacted
over a period of time between 1839 and 1882. See generally, Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Mar-
riage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1974) (discusses effect of Married
Women's Property Acts) (citing L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 40 (1969)).
Gaining the right to contract, accompanied by such rights as the right to sue and be sued, and
the right to own and manage property, superficially guaranteed women equality within a market
economy. Yet this formal equality obscured underlying unequal societal and economic conditions.
The right to contract insures the right (if not the means) to participate in the economics of the
patriarchal market system.
83. AcHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 2.04[2]; NOLO GUIDE, supra note 34, at § 3:5; OUR
RIGHT, supra note 65, at 217; LOVE ADVISOR, supra note 65, at 105.
84. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential of courts to
enforce implied contracts that do not necessarily reflect the parties' true intent.
85. OUR RIGHT, supra note 65, at 217.
86. P. CALIFIA, SAPPHISTRY: THE BOOK OF LESBIAN SEXUALITY 57 (1980).
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part of a couple,"'8 7 the authors promise that:
contracts can acknowledge day to day living issues and the depth and
richness in a relationship while at the same time providing guidelines
for the "what ifs" every couple faces. Once done, these guidelines can
contribute to the glue we've talked about as they provide a sense of
structure and commitment.8 8
While scrupulously avoiding the term "contract," the author of A Lesbian Love
Advisor emphasizes the importance of drawing up "love and partnership ac-
cords" that cover topics such as division of income and property, ownership of
major property, division of household services, maintenance and expenses, sex-
ual fidelity, quality of life considerations, children, disputes, and possible break-
up.8 9 The author argues that "written words of personal commitment can pre-
serve goodwill and friendship, even sanity" during relationships, and then speci-
fies that the "accords" are "enforceable not in a court of law, [but] only in a
court of love." 9
The enforcement of drafted accords in "a court of love" and similar meta-
phors are troublesome from a lesbian theoretical perspective: "Contract is far
from being opposed to patriarchy; contract is the means through which modern
patriarchy is constituted." 9 1 Further, social contract theory concerns "the
maintenance of existing power structures, replacing religious justification and
the 'divine right.' "92 If contract theory does perpetuate and legitimize the ex-
isting power structure-to the detriment of other potentially legitimate con-
structs-rooting lesbian relationships in a social contract system will never lead
to lesbian empowerment.
Not only might the re-enactment of contract theory within lesbian relation-
ships perpetuate patriarchy, but such use may obfuscate the aspirations of les-
bian relationships. The dominant ideology of contract theory "colonizes"
lesbian aspirations; contract "makes sense" and disallows other ways of think-
ing. Thus, the aspirations of lesbian relations become inexpressible because con-
tract is the available ideology of expression. 93
One attempt to dislodge contract ideology's application to the lesbian rela-
87. Press release for CLUNIs & GREEN, supra note 65 (on file with authors).
88. D. CLUNIS & C. GREEN, supra note 65, at 65-66.
In the subchapter entitled "Contracts," the authors support their suggestion that couples make
contracts by claiming:
[t]here are a lot of practical details involved in sharing one's life with a partner. To act as if
love is all we need is to ignore some practical realities. And it misses a wonderful opportu-
nity to create an agreement and contract that celebrates the specialness of the relationship.
Id at 65.
89. LOvE ADvISOR, supra note 65, at 104-06.
90. Id. at 105.
91. C. PATEMAN, supra note 75, at 2.
92. S. HOAGLAND, supra note 12, at 73.
93. See 2 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 318-61 (T. McCarthy
trans. 1989) (philosophical and social theoretical analysis of colonization of life by systemic perspec-
tives, such as money and power). See also Robson, The Colonization of the Lesbian Life-World: The
Possibilities of a Lesbian Theoretical Application of Jurgen Habennas (forthcoming) (application of
Habermas' theory of colonization to lesbian relationship contracts).
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tionship entails an examination of the contractual requirement of consideration,
exchange, and quid pro quo.94 While nonlesbians have claimed that life is "an
endless series of discrete contracts," 95 and lesbians have claimed that "we all
operate within our relationships on a contract,"' 96 contract ideology is similar to
what lesbian theorist Sarah Hoagland describes as a mercantile culture:
We talk of our investment in a relationship, of investing time and en-
ergy in each other, of negotiating differences; we want to make sure we
get our fair share in return for what we give, that we get our needs met,
and we often regard the relationship itself as an investment. Indeed,
such mercantile considerations have replaced our caring in many
instances.
Yet responding to each other need not be an exchange of debits
and credits. If we regard our connections as essentially a matter of
negotiating competing needs and wants and of sacrificing ourselves for
the other or of maintaining our interest at her expense, then we will
begin to take each other for granted or we will be trying to control
each other.97
Hoagland rejects the belief that obligation is the foundation on which lesbians
should build their relationships: "What we get from connecting with another is
not a series of bargains in return for a few compromises. What we get from
connecting with another is the connection." 98
If, as Hoagland suggests, lesbian theory disputes the power of patriarchal
claims such as mercantilism on a social level, then lesbian legal theory must also
examine such claims on the legal level. The development of a lesbian legal the-
ory must not only define law, but must delimit law within lesbianism. The cas-
ual acceptance of patriarchal contract theory as the method of organizing
lesbian relationships undermines the development of a specifically lesbian exist-
ence or theory. The habitual employment of contract documents and metaphors
to order lesbian relationships imports the considerable power of the patriarchal
state into lesbian existence.
One solution to the conflict between contract theory and lesbian legal the-
ory is to advocate complete abandonment of contracts between lesbians. This
solution, however, ignores the very real advantages contract can provide in spe-
cific instances, as well as dishonors the equally real empowerment that the abil-
ity to contract can provide for previously disempowered lesbians. A better
solution is to limit relationship contracts to intended legal documents that ad-
dress legal aspects of the relationship. Further, before drafting these legal docu-
ments, each party should consider that contract has a dual meaning: not only
may it serve as a factual, evidentiary device, but it may also inadvertently ex-
press a lesbian's own unique history. Finally, when negotiating such contracts,
94. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS, §§ 4-3 - 4-15 (3d. ed. 1987) (chap-
ter on consideration discusses exchange and quid pro quo as essential elements of contract.)
95. C. PATEMAN, supra note 75, at 15 (refers to persons who adopt contract theory as "contem-
porary contractarians").
96. OUR RIGHT, supra note 65, at 217.
97. S. HOAGLAND, supra note 12, at 274.
98. Id. at 275.
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each party should seriously discuss and confront the contract myths of equality
and freedom and how these myths operate in their particular situation. The goal
of lesbian legal theory must always be for lesbians to use contract rather than be
used by it.
III. STATE SANCTIONS: MARRIAGE, QUASI-MARRIAGE, AND ADOPTION
The difference is that I cannot live deferred. A stay of trans-
formation, the synthesis of the same singular women. And it's
this difference I ask of your body, the difference of other wo-
men with my regard. Identical to yours 9 9
The ultimate institution of coupledom is the state-sanctioned contract of
marriage. Marriage differs from other contracts in a variety of ways:
The marriage contract is unlike most contracts: its provisions are un-
written, its penalties are unspecified, and the terms of the contract are
typically unknown to the "contracting" parties. Prospective spouses
are neither informed of the terms of the contract nor are they allowed
any options about these terms. In fact one wonders how many men
and women would agree to the marriage contract if they were given
the opportunity to read it and to consider the rights and obligations to
which they were committing themselves. 100
The state promotes this ignorant contracting between heterosexual lovers la-
beled marriage as foundational for society'0 1 as well as for individual happi-
ness.10 2 The state's interest in marriage is evidenced by the state's scrupulous
99. N. BROSSARD, supra note 2, at 51.
100. Weitzman, supra note 82, at 1170.
101. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), in which the Court stated: "Mar-
riage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life ...." See also Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (Court found marriage is "the foundation of the family and society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress").
Other legal scholars have attempted to delineate just how marriage goes about its lofty business
of promoting civilization and progress. One commentator stated:
The marriage relationship promotes ... certain individual and community values. It is
perhaps impossible to list all the values promoted by the marriage relationship, but five
such values come readily to mind: (1) generosity or the spirit of sacrificial giving; (2) fidel-
ity or the honoring of commitments; (3) integrity or the creation of trust; (4) self-respect or
the assurances of personal worth; (5) sustained joy. These individual values acquire added
significance for society because individual and community values are interrelated ....
Society benefits from a process of value infusion whereby those individual values nurtured
into the marriage relationship are transmitted to the broader community.
Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541, 542 n.8 (1985).
See also Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the
Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 472 (1983) (values produced and promoted
by the marriage relationship are related to political ends of democracy, because "it is primarily
through family bonds that both children and parents learn attitudes and skills that sustain an open
society").
102. There are substantial psychological and social benefits arising from the "sense of worth
that comes with acceptance by the community." Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on
The Right to Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George-or Mary and Alice at the Same Time?, 10 J.
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patrolling of the boundaries of the institution; the state exclusively regulates the
terms and conditions of participation in the institution, 10 3 provides incentives
for participants in the institution, t ° 4 and exclusively regulates the terms and
conditions of the termination of participation in the institution. 105
The state's historic power to regulate marriage is exercised in many particu-
lars; not only do states "prohibit marriage between persons of the same sex,
between persons in certain relationships of consanguinity and affinity, and be-
tween persons where one has a living spouse,"' t 6 but states also regulate mar-
riage by imposing age and blood testing requirements.10 7 Courts have only
infrequently inhibited the range of a state's authority to restrict marriage, as in
the belated condemnation of miscegenation laws.108 Nevertheless, a few lesbians
and gay men have litigated marriage issues.
There are only a few cases in which same-sex couples have litigated for the
right to secure a marriage license10 9 and a handful of others in which a claim
CONTEMP. L. 33, 37 (1984). The author states that "[m]arriage is generally viewed as strengthening
the stability, emotional health, and social respectability of a relationship between two people." Id.
103. See, e.g., Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205 (legislature prescribes all parameters of marriage, in-
cluding age, procedure, duties, property rights, and dissolution).
104. There are substantial legal and economic benefits that inure to those who are married,
including: tax exemptions, social security benefits, preferred immigration status, tort recovery for
wrongful death, recovery based on loss of consortium, ease of adopting children, state protection in
inheritance laws regulating intestate succession (as well as mandatory elective share of estate for
survivor), coverage by employee and other health insurance, lowered rates for insurance including
automobile insurance, community property rights, spousal privilege for testifying, and housing and
zoning regulations requiring particular family relationships.
105. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Anderson Supp. 1989) (court may grant
divorce on several grounds: adultery, extreme cruelty, and fraudulent contract); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-3-3.1 (1988) (court may grant divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, without alleging
fault of either party); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.020 (Supp. 1990) (divorce petition must set
forth date and place of marriage, names and ages of children; must complete certificate and file with
petition).
106. Ingram, supra note 102, at 34.
107. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-7-1-5 - 31-7-2-3 (Burns 1987) (individuals must be eigh-
teen years of age to marry, unless petition court for special order); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-7-4-2
(Burns 1987) (female who intends to marry must take test for immunological response to rubella);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-6 (Supp. 1990) (minors may not marry without consent of parents or guard-
ian; those under age 16 must procure written consent of judge); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-20 (1968)
(requires syphilis test before issuance of marriage license).
108. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia's prohibition of interracial marriage
declared unconstitutional). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Court held unconsti-
tutional state statute that prohibited issuance of marriage license to someone having outstanding
child support obligations); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Court held that state could
not deny indigents right to divorce). Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (challenge to
state law prohibiting all persons from using contraceptives upheld).
109. See Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (two females sought to compel
county clerk to issue them application for marriage license); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,
(Ky. 1973) (appeal from refusal to grant marriage license to two females); Baker v. Nelson, 291
Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971) (statute governing marriage prohibits marriage between persons
of same sex), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d
1187 (1974) (appeal from refusal to grant marriage license to two males).
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relating to whether a relationship constituted "marriage" was raised.110 In the
cases where the parties involved have been found to be of the same sex, the
courts have uniformly rejected any recognition of marital status.''
In many cases, the claims of same-sex couples seeking to obtain legal recog-
nition of their relationship have been rejected summarily by courts in decisions
that contain little constitutional analysis and often involve circular reasoning.112
While legal commentators have increasingly expounded on the necessity for rec-
ognizing same-sex marriage, 1 3 and have produced elaborate constitutional ra-
110. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.) (male couple claimed spousal immigra-
tion status based on "marriage" by minister), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); M.T. v. J.T., 140
N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (App. Div.) (as defense to complaint for support and maintenance,
husband interposed defense that wife was male and marriage void), cert. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364
A.2d 1076 (1976); Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974) (wife brought action for annul-
ment on ground husband was female); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d
499 (1971) (male plaintiff seeking declaration of marital status where he unknowingly married an-
other male); De Santo v. Barnsley, 328 Pa. Super. 181, 476 A.2d 952 (1984) (complaint for divorce
filed by male against another male alleging common-law marriage).
11. Courts treat transsexuals more favorably, however. See generally M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J.
Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (App. Div.) (transsexual, born with physical characteristics of male but who
went through successful sex reassignment surgery, termed female person for marital purposes and
subsequent marriage to male was not void), cert denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976).
112. See Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 588. In Jones, the court based its rejection of petitioner's request
for a marriage license on little more than the fact that the dictionary definition of marriage stated
that it involved members of the opposite sex. The court concluded that "[i]n substance, the relation-
ship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what
they propose is not a marriage." Id. at 590. See also Singer, 11 Wash. App. at 261, 522 P.2d at 1196
(appellants not denied marriage license because of their sex; rather, marriage license denied because
of nature of marriage itself); Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (court explained "marriage is and
always has been a contract between a man and a woman").
113. See Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional
Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 134, 136-37 (1988) (laws that
deny same-sex couples right to marry interferes with individual rights; cannot withstand judicial
scrutiny); Ingram, supra note 102, at 35 (it is time to recognize same-sex marriages); Lewis, From
This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1802
(1988) (traditional definition of marriage must change to render the fundamental right to marry
truly effective for all individuals regardless of sexual orientation); Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orien-
tation Law in the Mid-Eighties Part I, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459, 540 (1985) (withholding legal
recognition of gay relationships denies intimate companionship to gays); Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual
Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties Part II, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 324-25, 373, 398 (1986)
[hereinafter Rivera, Queer Law Part I1] (failure to recognize same-sex marriages prohibits some from
receiving financial and legal benefits); Rivera, supra note 53, at 878 (homosexual couples will con-
tinue to seek inclusion under marriage laws or through legislation granting same financial and legal
benefits as married heterosexuals); Schwarzchild, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy:
Moral Threat and Legal Anomaly, 4 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 94, 98 (1988) (systematic denial by courts
of claims of same-sex couples to marital privacy is anomaly given society's fundamental interest in
maintaining the institution of marriage); Note, Marriage: Homosexual Couples Need Not Apply, 23
NEW ENG. L. REV. 515, 546 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Marriage] (same-sex couples will not be
"authentic" if legal system evades reality of existence of same-sex lovers that are families); Note,
Homosexuals'Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
193, 193 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry] (states must afford homosexuals
opportunity to marry); Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 573 (1973)
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tionales to justify their positions," 4 courts have remained unimpressed with
such arguments and have rejected constitutional challenges to the state's refusal
to recognize same-sex marriages. For example, the courts have rejected the ar-
gument that restricting marriage to members of the opposite sex is irrational
and/or discriminatory. 115 Courts have also refused to define marriage as a fun-
damental right requiring the strict standard of judicial scrutiny that the Supreme
Court announced in Loving v. Virginia."16 Likewise, courts have refused to find
(denial of marriage license to homosexual couples violates equal protection clause of fourteenth
amendment).
114. Those who advocate recognition of same-sex marriages base their arguments on the four-
teenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment states: "(No State
shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310,
191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The Baker court stated:
Petitioners contend, second, that Minn.St. c. 517, so interpreted, is unconstitutional.
There is a dual aspect to this contention: The prohibition of a same-sex marriage denies
petitioners a fundamental right guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, arguably made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
petitioners are deprived of liberty and property without due process and are denied the
equal protection of the laws, both guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id at 312, 191 N.W.2d at 186. See also Friedman, supra note 113, at 152 (right to family, marriage,
and procreation shared by same-sex couples clearly fall under fourteenth amendment protection of
fundamental rights); Ingram, supra note 102, at 39 (statutes regulating marriage challenged on basis
of equal protection or due process of laws); Note, Marriage, supra note 113, at 527 (both nonconsti-
tutional and constitutional arguments for same-sex marriages rejected); Note, Homosexual's Right to
Marry, supra note 113, at 193 (under equal protection analysis, homosexual couples in exclusive,
long-term relationships are similarly situated to committed heterosexual couples); Note, The Legal-
ity of Homosexual Marriage, supra note 113, at 573 (denial of marriage licenses to homosexual
couples violates equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment).
115. See Baker, 291 Minn. at 313-14, 191 N.W.2d at 187. The court stated:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the due process
clause, is not offended by the state's classification of persons authorized to marry. There is
no irrational or invidious discrimination. Petitioners note that the state does not impose
upon heterosexual married couples a condition that they have a proved capacity or de-
clared willingness to procreate, posing a rhetorical demand that this court must read such a
condition into the statute if same-sex marriages are to be prohibited. Even assuming that
such a condition would be neither unrealistic nor offensive under the Griswold rationale,
the classification is no more than theoretically imperfect. We are reminded, however, that
"abstract symmetry" is not demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id
116. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Loving, the Court stated:
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very existence
and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on so insupportable a basis as the racial
classification embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the princi-
ple of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.
Id at 12 (citations omitted). After quoting the above language from Loving, the court in Baker held:
Loving does indicate that not all state restrictions upon the right to marry are beyond the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in commonsense and in a constitutional sense,
there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one
based upon the fundamental difference in sex.
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lesbianism or homosexuality a suspect classification. 1 7 Claims of sex discrimi-
nation have failed both under the federal Constitution and under a state equal
rights amendment."t 8 Appeals to the constitutional rights of association and
free exercise of religion also have been summarily dismissed.'t 9 Finally, a recent
challenge to an ordinance prohibiting "sexual orientation discrimination" has
been unsuccessful. 120
The state-sanctioned procedure of adoption, which has been used as a
"quasi-marital vehicle," temporarily enjoyed limited success for lesbian and gay
couples seeking to define themselves within the legal rubric of "family."' 2'
Adoption of one adult by another-as distinguished from the adoption of a child
by an adult-is an anomaly because adoption is premised on the reproduction of
a parent-child relationship. Many state statutes allow limited adult adoptions
that require circumstances correlated to a parent-child relationship.' 22 Where
the statute itself is not restrictive, courts may interpret the statute as restricting a
lesbian from adopting her partner. For example, in New York, although a fam-
ily court and an appellate court allowed the adult adoption of one gay man by
291 Minn. at 315, 191 N.W.2d at 187 (emphasis supplied).
117. See Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 262, 522 P.2d 1187, 1196 (1974). The Singer
court stated: "Although appellants present argument to the contrary, we agree with the state's
contention that to define marriage to exclude homosexual or any other same-sex relationships is not
to create an inherently suspect legislative classification requiring strict judicial scrutiny to determine
a compelling state interest." Id.
118. Id. Pertinent portions of the Singer opinion stated: "As we have already held in connec-
tion with our discussion of the ERA, however, appellants do not present a case of sexual discrimina-
tion. Appellants were not denied a marriage license because of their sex; rather, they were denied a
marriage license because of the nature of marriage itself." Id.
119. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973) in which the court stated:
Baker v. Nelson considered many of the constitutional issues raised by the appellants
here and decided them adversely to appellants. In our view, however, no constitutional
issue is involved. We find no constitutional sanction or protection of the right of marriage
between persons of the same sex.
In substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the issu-
ance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a marriage.
Id.
120. See Outlines, Jan. 1990, at 20, col. 3 (appeal to Illinois Human Relations Commission
based on Chicago's Human Rights Ordinance prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination and
based on state Human Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination).
121. See In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 106 Misc. 2d 792, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Faro. Ct.,
Kings County 1981) [hereinafter Anonymous I] (adoption of male by homosexual partner granted).
122. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 222 (West 1982) (adoptee must be at least ten years younger
than adopter); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-67 (West Supp. 1989) (adoptee must be younger than
adopter); FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1989) (homosexuals not eligible to adopt); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1501 (1979) (adults may be adopted only if would have been adopted as minors but for inadvertence,
mistake or neglect); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22-2 (Supp. 1983-84) (adoptee must be at least ten years
younger than adopter); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02 (Page 1989) (adult may be adopted only if
permanently disabled, mentally retarded or if child-foster parent or child-stepparent relationship
established while adoptee was minor); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-222 (Supp. 1989) (adult adoptee must
have resided with adopter for at least three months before adoptee's eighteenth birthday).
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another,1 23 the highest court later declined to interpret the adoption statute to
"permit one lover, homosexual or heterosexual, to adopt the other and enjoy the
sanction of law on their feigned union as parent and child." 124 Thus, adoption
between lesbian couples is apparently not currently judicially feasible absent spe-
123. See Anonymous 1, 106 Misc. 2d at 797, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 530 (statutory definition of adop-
tion proceeding broad enough to encompass legal relationship parties here seek to create). The court
addressed the issue of whether it properly could refuse to grant an adoption between two consenting
adults who have a homosexual relationship. Id. It held that the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard, applicable in adoption of minors cases, was not applicable in cases involving consenting adults.
Id. at 800, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 531. The court also noted that it did not wish to allow the adoption
statute to shield homosexuality, nor did it wish to appear to approve of or encourage homosexuality.
Ie at 792-93, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 527. Nevertheless, the adoption petition was granted and the court
stated that "there are no public policy or public morality considerations which operate as a bar to
[this] adoption." Id. at 800, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 531. Much of the court's reasoning stemmed from a
New York case in which sodomy was decriminalized and which the court depicted as dispositive of
the public policy and public morality issues surrounding the instant adoption petition. Id. at 799,
435 N.Y.S.2d at 531 (criminalization of consensual sodomy between persons not married violates
privacy and equal protection notions) (citing People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947 (N.Y. 1980)), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
A New York appellate court followed the reasoning of the Anonymous I court a year after that
decision was written. See In re Adult Anonymous II, 88 A.D.2d 30, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1982) [hereinafter Anonymous II] (homosexual's petition to adopt lover nine years older
granted). In reversing a lower court's dismissal of the petition of an adult male to adopt his male
lover, the court stated:
Historically, more frequently than not, adoption has served as a legal mechanism for
achieving economic, political and social objectives rather than the stereotype parent-child
relationship. Adoption is often utilized by adults for strictly economic purposes, especially
inheritance. Other considerations include insurance, tax impact and in this case, the apart-
ment. Such a material concern is one of sober life reality and should not be regarded by the
court as a cynical device to evade the strictures of the parties' leases or the policy of the
adoption law.
Id. at 33, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 200 (citations omitted). In specifically addressing the issue of the parties'
relationship, the court reasoned:
The "nuclear family" arrangement is no longer the only model of family life in America.
The realities of present day urban life allow many different types of nontraditional families.
The statutes involved do not permit this Court to deny a petition for adoption on the basis
of this court's view of what is the nature of a family. In any event, the best description of a
family is a continuing relationship of love and care, and an assumption of responsibility for
some other person. Certainly that is present in the instant case.
Id. at 35, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
124. In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 238, 471 N.E.2d 424,427, 481 N.Y.S.2d
652, 655 (N.Y. 1984) (legislature, not court, must change adoption laws to allow lovers to create
nonmatrimonial legal relationship). The court, quoting from the dissenting opinion in Anonymous
II, labeled adoption in the case of lovers a "cynical distortion of the function of adoption." Id. at
238, 471 N.E.2d at 427, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 655 (quoting Anonymous H, 88 A.D.2d at 38, 452 N.Y.S.2d
at 203 (Sullivan J., dissenting)). The court noted that although the New York statute was broad, the
adoption statute
embodies the fundamental social concept that the relationship of parent and child may be
established by operation of law. Despite the absence of any blood ties, in the eyes of the
law an adopted child becomes "the natural child of the adopted parent" with all the attend-
ant personal and proprietary incidents to that relationship. Indeed, the adoption laws of
New York, as well as those of most of the States, reflect the general acceptance of the
ancient principle of adoptio naturam imitatur-i.e., adoption imitates nature, which
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cial circumstances indicating a parent-child relationship.1 25
Other litigation strategies through which lesbians seek recognition of quasi-
marital status have included the pursuit of specific spousal benefits such as
worker compensation survivor benefits126 and occupancy rights to a rent con-
trolled apartment.1 27 These strategies seek to include the lovers within the defi-
nitions of "member of household" or "member of family."' 128 The expansive
originated in Roman jurisprudence, which, in turn, served as a guide for the development
of adoption statutes in this country.
In imitating nature, adoption in New York, as explicitly defined in section 110 of the
Domestic Relations Law, is "the legal proceeding whereby a person takes another person
into the relation of child and thereby acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities of
parent." It is plainly not a quasi-matrimonial vehicle to provide nonmarried partners with
a legal imprimatur for their sexual relationship, be it heterosexual or homosexual. More-
over, any such sexual intimacy is utterly repugnant to the relationship between child and
parent in our society, and only a patently incongruous application of our adoption laws-
wholly inconsistent with the underlying public policy of providing a parent-child relation-
ship for the welfare of the child-would permit the employment of adoption as the legal
formalization of an adult relationship between sexual partners under the guise of parent
and child.
Id. at 236, 471 N.E.2d at 425-26, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 653-54 (citations omitted).
125. See ACHTENBERG, supra note 34, at § 1.05 (exploration of recent cases in which adoption
denied to adult homosexual couples); Rivera, Queer Law Part II, supra note 113, at 379-80 n.84
(Ohio adult nonadoption rule excepted, inter alia, where child-foster parent or child-stepparent rela-
tionship established when adoptee minor); Note, Property Rights of Same Sex Couplet" Toward a
New Definition of Family, 26 J. FAM. LAW 357, 363 (1987-88) (marriage and adoption laws con-
strued as precluding gay couples from their scope).
126. See Donovan v. County of Los Angeles & State Compensation Ins. Fund, 73 Cal. Comp.
Cases (Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 3, 1983) (same-sex partner awarded workers' compensation
benefits upon work-related death of lover).
127. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y.
1989) (rent control statute protecting "family members" construed as protecting homosexual part-
ners with ten year relationship).
128. See Note, Donovan v. County of Los Angeles and State Compensation Insurance Fund:
California's Recognition of Homosexuals' Dependency Status in Actions For Worker's Compensation
Death Benefits, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 151, 153-54, 156 & n.23 (1986) (good faith dependency test is
whether claimant member of deceased's household and whether actually was supported during that
period) (citing Donovan, 73 Cal. Comp. Cases (Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 3, 1983) (California
Worker's Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) held that homosexual relationship can satisfy the
"good faith membership of the household" requirement for establishing dependency in an action to
collect worker's compensation benefits); Donovan v. County of Los Angeles & State Compensation
Ins. Fund, 73 Cal. Comp. Cases (Workers Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 24, 1984) (WCAB stated it was "not
persuaded that the inability to enter a recognized marriage should be controlling on whether a per-
son is a good faith member of the household.")). Id..
In Braschi, the New York Court of Appeals held that Miguel Braschi was not excluded as a
matter of law from seeking noneviction protection through a regulation that ensured that landlords,
upon the death of a rent-control tenant, would not dispossess "either the surviving spouse of the
deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family who has been living with the
tenant." Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785. The court interpreted
the word "family" expansively:
Family members, whether or not related by blood, or law who have always treated the
apartment as their family home will be protected against the hardship of eviction following
the death of the named tenant, thereby furthering the Legislature's goals of preventing
dislocation and preserving family units which might otherwise be broken apart upon evic-
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notion of household and family advanced in such cases, however, is ex post facto.
While the existence of a marriage or adoption may have alleviated the problem
of the surviving partner, the couple has nevertheless been sundered by the
death. 129 Thus, had marital or quasi-marital legal status been operative, these
post-mortem strategies would have been unnecessary.
In the legislative area, attempts to gain legal recognition of lesbian and gay
partnerships generally have not been focused on expanding the notions of family
and household, 130 but have been focused on recognizing marriage and a form of
quasi-marriage, domestic partnership. 13' Domestic partnership legislation has
succeeded in only a few cities and recently was defeated in a San Francisco
referendum. 132 The San Francisco ordinance would have required that those
who wish to participate in domestic partnerships, and who met the eligibility
requirements, register with the city of San Francisco. 133 The material benefits
tion. This approach will foster the transition from rent control to rent stabilization by
drawing a distinction between those individuals who are, in fact, genuine family members,
and those who are mere roommates or newly discovered relatives hoping to inherit the
rent-controlled apartment after the existing tenant's death.
Id. at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (citations omitted). Braschi has since been ex-
tended in other contexts. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 1989, at 25, col. 1 (reporting Athineos v. Thayer which
extends Braschi to unadopted orphan); N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30, 1989, at 21, col. 6 (reporting 2-4 Realty
Ass'n v. Pittman, which extends Braschi to homosexual partners and parent of partner who also
cohabitated with partners).
129. Thus, like wills and testamentary documents, these litigation approaches are more in the
nature of tools. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits af-
forded to lesbians by the calculated employment of such tools.
130. However, the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal codified
Braschi in the form of emergency amendments after the decision. These amendments have been
challenged in an action in trial court by an association of landlords.
131. See San Francisco Bay Times, Sept. 1989, at 10, col. 1 (California bar association poised to
vote on recommending legalizing same-sex marriage); Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the
Right to Marry, 6 OUTLOOK 9 (1989) (marriage is political issue that most fully tests dedication of
nongays to full equality for gays, and also issue most likely to lead to world free of discrimination
against lesbians and gay men).
The conference of the delegates of the state bar of California adopted a resolution (Resolution 3-
8) recommending that the state legislature amend the marriage statute to be "neutral as to sex." 7
Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom Newsletter No. 7, 1 (October 1989) The resolution,
which would replace the words "between a man and a woman" with "between two people"
provided:
MARRIAGES: NEUTRAL AS TO SEX RESOLVED that the Conference of Dele-
gates recommends that legislation be sponsored to amend Civil Code section 4100 to read:
Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between two people, to which
consent of the parties capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent alone will not
constitute marriage, it must be followed by the issuance of a license and solemnization as
authorized by this code, except as provided by Section 4213.
Id.
See also, Developments, Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1628 (1989)
("Courts and legislatures should legalize same-sex marriage").
132. See Outlines, Dec. 1989, at 20, col. I (gays lose all five referenda).
133. San Francisco, Cal. Ordinance 216-89 (Nov. 7, 1989) (rejected by voters under "Proposi-
tion S"). The proposed ordinance required that the parties be over 18 years old, live together, share
"basic living expenses", and sign a declaration of domestic partnership to be filed with the city.
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under the proposed ordinance were limited; they consisted of only the right to
hospital visitation and the extension of bereavement leave to city workers.
While marriage and the quasi-marriage relationships contemplated by
adoption and domestic partnership have many practical benefits,1 34 as well as
practical disadvantages,1 35 marriage and quasi-marriage are suspect in lesbian
legal theory. Underlying the lesbian critique of marriage is the gendered per-
spective on marriage developed by feminists. For example, feminist historian
Gerda Lerner grounds current feminist antagonism toward marriage in an anal-
ysis of marriage as a transaction in which women are the objects of contractual
relations:
The customary right of male family members (fathers, brother, uncles)
to exchange female family members in marriage antedated the develop-
ment of the patriarchal family and was one of the factors leading to its
ascendancy.
The first gender-defined social role for women was to be those who
were exchanged in marriage transactions. The obverse gender role for
men was to be those who did the exchanging or who defined the terms
of the exchanges. 136
Marriage has remained interwoven with both the development and the per-
petuation of patriarchy and women's status within patriarchy. In the common
law of England, the wife's identity merged into that of the husband,137 a status
which continued until passages of the Married Women's Property Acts during
the 1840's and afterwards.1 38 With the rights of women so rigidly curtailed by
marriage, it is not surprising that the early anarchist/feminist Emma Goldman
proclaimed that marriage condemned women "to lifelong dependency, to para-
134. See supra note 104 for a list of some of the legal benefits of marriage.
135. The disadvantages of marriage or quasi-marriage relationships might include financial re-
sponsibilities for debts incurred, possibility of continuing financial support obligations after terminat-
ing the relationship, tax disadvantages for couples whose earnings are substantially the same, the
inability to terminate the relationship without state intervention, and heightened difficulty in ob-
taining public assistance.
136. G. LERNER, THE CREATION OF THE PATRIARCHY 110-11, 214 (1986) (analysis of origins
of patriarchy).
137. See Weitzman, supra note 82, at 1172:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law .... [Tmhe very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing, protection and cover she per-
forms everything.
(A] married woman lost control of her real property as well as ownership of her chattels.
She could not make a contract in her own name, either with her husband or with third
parties, and she could neither sue or be sued in her own name. If she worked, her husband
was entitled to her wages, and if she and her husband were to separate, her husband invari-
ably would gain custody of the children.
Id. (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442).
138. Id. See also supra note 82 for a further discussion of the Married Women's Property Acts.
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sitism, [and] to complete uselessness individual as well as social."' 39
During the second wave of feminism that began in the late 1960's, many
feminists focused on marriage. A typical legal commentary suggested that con-
temporary marriage continued to reflect the practices of English common law:
Private practices within marriage may not always conform to this
traditional "contract" but it is clear that present statutory and case law
continue to uphold these traditional obligations of husband and wife.
The essential provisions of this traditional marriage contract rec-
ognize the husband as head of the household, hold the husband re-
sponsible for support, and hold the wife responsible for domestic and
child-care services. Each of these provisions is rooted in common law
and each remains alive and well in 1974. It will be argued however,
that their endurance is anachronistic, their burdens unconstitutional.
The weight of these burdens falls most heavily on women and each
should and will face an increasing number of challenges in the near
future. 140
Feminist scholar Kathleen Barry explicitly linked marriage and prostitu-
tion.14 1 More recently, feminist theorists such as Carole Pateman have engaged
in sophisticated attempts to link sexual and contract theories. Pateman states:
"An exploration of contracts about property in the person to which women
must be a party-the marriage contract, the prostitution contract and the surro-
gacy contract-show that the body of woman is precisely what is at issue in the
contract." 14 2
While incorporating and building on feminist critiques of the institution of
marriage, lesbian theory is characterized by an expanded and uniquely lesbian
analysis of the problems generated by marriage. Lesbian theorist Monique Wit-
tig, for example, postulates that lesbianism can give people a unique perspective
on marriage in stating: "Lesbianism is the culture through which we can politi-
cally question heterosexual society on its sexual categories, on the meaning of its
institutions of domination in general, and in particular on the meaning of that
institution of personal dependence, marriage, imposed on women".' 43
139. Goldman, Marriage and Love, in LIBERATION Now: WRrlINGS FROM THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT 161 (1971).
140. Weitzman, supra note 82, at 1173.
141. See K. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 271 (1971). Barry writes:
Marriage and prostitution are experiences of individuals but they are also institutions.
They are in fact the primary institutions through which sex is conveyed and in which
female sexual slavery is practiced. Sex is purchased through prostitution and legally ac-
quired through marriage; in both as well as outside each it may be seized by force.
Marriage as an institution of legalized love, presumes sex as a duty, a wife's responsi-
bility. Regardless of the mutuality of feeling that may exist when two people enter mar-
riage it is often the case that after the original relationship breaks down, men still assume
sex as their automatic right.
Id
142. C. PATEMAN, supra note 75, at 224.
143. Wittig, Paradigm, in HOMOSEXUALITIES AND FRENCH LITERATURE 114,118 (Stambolin
& Marks ed. 1979).
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The possibility of lesbian marriage challenges the characterization of mar-
riage as a relentlessly heterosexual institution. Yet lesbian theory has not neces-
sarily abandoned the categorization of marriage as heterosexual. For example,
lesbian attorney Paula Ettelbrick rejects marriage as an appropriate ambition for
lesbians:
[Miarriage will not liberate us as lesbians and gay men. In fact, it will
constrain us, make us invisible, force our assimilation into the main-
stream, and undermine the goals of gay liberation ....
[G]ay marriage instead of liberating gay sex and sexuality, would
further outlaw all gay and lesbian sex which is not performed in a
marital context .... The only legitimate gay sex would be that which
is cloaked in and regulated by marriage. 44
Joan Nestle extends Ettelbrick's argument about lesbian sexuality by sug-
gesting that the lesbian community's attempt to "sanitize" the appearance of
their relationships in public has hurt the causes of both gay men and lesbians.' 45
In addition, the prospect of lesbian marriage is detrimental because it creates a
two-tier system of "good" and "bad" lesbians that elevates married lesbian
couples over other varieties of lesbian relationships.14 6 Ettelbrick's argument
points to the irony of lesbians pursuing the right to marry, when that right is the
right of the state to control, regulate, and dominate the marriage relationship.
The exercise of that right is especially ironic considering the state's current and
historic power to criminalize lesbian sexuality, a power that is often exercised.147
While it has been suggested that the "practical, political and philosophical" re-
wards of the right to marry are worth the state intrusions, 148 the price of state
recognition of lesbian marriage is excessive from the perspective of lesbian legal
theory.
144. Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 6 OUTLOOK 9, 14, 16 (1989).
145. Nestle states:
In these painful and challenging times, we must not run out on gay men and leave them
holding the sexuality bag. It is tempting to some Lesbians to see themselves as the clean
sexual deviant, to disassociate themselves from public sexual activity, multiple partners,
and intergenerational sex. While this may be the choice for some of us, it is not the reality
of many others, not now and not in the past. Lesbian purity, a public image that drapes us
in the cloak of monogamous long-term relationships, discrete at-home social gatherings
and a basic urge to re-create the family, helps no one ....
[B]y allowing ourselves to be portrayed as the good deviant, the respectable deviant, we
lose more than we will ever gain. We lose the complexity of our own lives, and we lose
what for me has been a lifelong lesson; you do not betray your comrades when the
scapegoating begins.
J. NESTLE, A RESTRICTED COUNTRY 123 (1987).
146. Ettelbrick, supra note 144, at 17.
147. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia currently criminalize lesbian sexual prac-
tices. See Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 521, 524 n.9 (1986) (private consensual sodomy criminal offense in 24 states and the
District of Columbia).
148. Stoddard, supra note 131, at 10-13 (inheritance and other property rights, politico-institu-
tional recognition, and personal symbolic benefits would inure to marrieds).
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Pursuing state approval of relationships also forces lesbian partners into
potentially damaging attempts to calibrate their lives to conform to heterosexual
models. Several lesbian theorists have explored the damaging nature of this cali-
bration in the context of lesbian sexual expression. For example, in exploring
the phenomenon of the "hetero-relationizing" of female affection,1 49 philosopher
Janice Raymond contends that gyn/affection often becomes transmogrified
through the use of heterosexual terms that "signify either the presence of illicit
heterosexuality (prostitute, whore) or the absence of approved heterosexuality
(frigid, old maid)". 1 50 Under Raymond's perception, the hetero-relationizing of
lesbian couples into man/wife dyads appears probable because all women must
be defined heterosexually, even if that heterosexuality is a transmogrified
farce. 151
Similarly, lesbian theorist Marilyn Frye addresses the hazards of the inter-
nal hetero-relationizing of lesbian relationships by lesbians in an article entitled
Lesbian "Sex". 15 2 In commenting on a sociological sex survey that concluded
that lesbian couples have sex less often than gay male or heterosexual couples-
and the discussion that the study raised in the lesbian communities-Frye asks:
"What violence did lesbians do their experience by answering the same question
the heterosexuals answered, as though it had the same meaning for them?" 15 3
Frye contends that since sex has always been defined as a phallic process demar-
cated by male ejaculation, lesbians do violence to their experience by attempting
to:
[M]old our loving and our passionate carnal intercourse into explosive
8-minute events. That is not the timing and ontology of the lesbian
body. When the only thing that counts as "doing it" are those
passages of our interactions which closely approximate a paradigm
that arose from the meaning of the rising and falling penis, no wonder
we discover ourselves to "do it" rather less often than do pairs with
one or more penises present. 1 54
Lesbian ethicist Sarah Hoagland has produced the most extensive argument
about lesbian relationships. She suggests that lesbians resist hetero-relationizing
and depart from heterosexual stereotypes in describing lesbian relationships:
149. J. RAYMOND, A PASSION FOR FRIENDS: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF FEMALE AFFEc-
TION (1986) (heterorelationizing defined as socio-politico-economic relation of women to men as
defined by men).
150. Id at 65 (in heterohistory, women defined in terms of men; therefore gynaffection is no
affection and merely is lewd).
151. See Robson, Lavender Bruise" Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. - (1990) (hetero-relationizing lesbian relationships affects intra-lesbian
violence, especially intimate battering) (forthcoming publication).
152. Frye, Lesbian "Sex", 35 SINISTER WISDOM 46 (1988) (reprinted in LESBIAN PHILOSO-
PHIES AND CULTURES, supra note 12). Cf Nichols, Lesbian Sexuality: Issues and Developing The-
ory; and Doing Sex Therapy with Lesbians: Bending a Heterosexual Paradigm to Fit a Gay Lifestyle,
in LESBIAN PSYCHOLOGIES, supra note 65, at 97, 242 (argues that lesbian sexuality needs to become
more "male" in its orientation).
153. Frye, supra note 152, at 49.
154. Id. at 53.
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"We need new language and new meaning to develop our lesbian desire."' 155
Hoagland implicitly questions not only the propriety of lesbian marriage or
quasi-marriage, but also underlying concepts of coupledom. She concludes that
by "overlap[ping] the concept of 'friend' and 'lover,' our connections in the com-
munity and the community itself will become stronger, particularly through ex-
tended relationships."' 56 For Hoagland the variety of connections between
lesbians is a source of strength and security for lesbian experience. Rigidity of
form would serve to stifle both the lesbian relationship and the community.
Lesbian attorney Paula Ettelbrick echoes the sentiments of Raymond, Frye,
and Hoagland:
Being queer is more than setting up house, sleeping with a person of
the same gender, and seeking state approval for doing so. It is an iden-
tity, a culture with many variations .... Being queer means pushing
the parameters of sex, sexuality, and the family, and in the same pro-
cess transforming the very fabric of society.
157
The specter of lesbian marriage and lesbian quasi-marriage thus poses the
danger of demarcating acceptable lesbians (married couples) from unacceptable
lesbians (unmarried), as well as threatens to hetero-relationize and erase lesbian-
ism. Marriage is an attempt to limit the multiplicity of relationships and the
complexities of coupling in the lesbian experience. While it might be argued that
the very inclusion of lesbians within the marriage institution will necessarily
transform the institution, 5 8 the necessary corollary to that argument is that the
inclusion of lesbians within the marriage institution will transform lesbian rela-
tions. The transformation of lesbianism by participation in marriage will not be
positive; it will demarcate acceptable lesbian relationships and sexualities from
unacceptable ones and it will hetero-relationize lesbianism. Perhaps rather than
advocating that marriage be available to lesbians, lesbian legal theory should
advance the proposition that marriage should be abolished as a sexist, heterosex-
ist, and narrow institution.1 59
155. S. HOAGLAND, supra note 12, at 168.
156. Id. at 173.
157. Ettelbrick, supra note 144, at 14 (justice for lesbians and gay men requires societal accept-
ance of homosexuals' differences, though legal system generally does not support differences).
158. See Stoddard, supra note 131, at 13 (marriage unattractive as currently structured, but
enlarging concept to embrace same-sex couples can be means through which institution divests itself
of sexist trappings).
159. For arguments from different perspectives advocating the abolishment of marriage, see
generally M. BARRETr & M. McIrrosH, THE ANI-SOCIAL FAMILY (1982) (socialist-feminist per-
spective discussed); Goldman, supra note 139 (anarchist perspective discussed).
See also M. BARRETT & M. McINTosH, supra, at 144-46 (marriage-like relations challenged as
privileging home life); Weinzweig, Should a Feminist Choose a Marriage-Like Relationship?, 1 Hy-
PATIA 139 (1986) (coupled relationships analyzed from perspective of achieving feminist goals of
equality, freedom, and self-development); Note, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Indi-
vidual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197 (1988) (marriage should not be abolished; economic




a lesbian who does not reinvent the world is a lesbian in the
process of disappearing1 "°
Lesbians-as couples, partners, and lovers-are legal strangers. Lesbians
understandably seek to procure the status that is guaranteed "family" members,
"blood relations" or "spouses," to remedy specific disadvantages and forestall
tragedies. Lesbian legal theory must consider the legal methods that might as-
sist individual lesbians yet be compatible with a specifically lesbian legal theory.
Recognizing that it is impossible for lesbians to insulate themselves from the law
does not mandate that lesbians automatically embrace all legal methods.
In analyzing legal approaches to lesbian coupledom, this article has devel-
oped a tripartite scheme. First, legal mechanisms such as powers of attorney,
trusts and wills, and other "tools" may assist lesbians who find themselves in the
legal arena and do not interfere with the lesbian relationship. These "tools" are
of a limited nature; they essentially counteract laws and rules that would other-
wise operate in favor of blood relations. Second, while contracts may also bene-
fit individual lesbians, the origins and assumptions of contract ideology render
relationship contracts questionable. Relationship contracts between lesbians
may "colonize" the relationship, especially when such contracts address nonle-
gal matters. Third, the lesbian pursuit of marriage and quasi-marriage status
may also provide specific benefits, but it impermissibly demarcates categories of
lesbians and hetero-relationizes lesbian existence.
The tripartite scheme used in this article is intended as an analytic strategy
for investigating and evaluating the various options for lesbian lovers. As those
of us who have taken up the task further develop lesbian legal theory, these
concepts will evolve and change. Lesbian relationships are multifarious, enig-
matic, and eclectic. Lesbians need a commensurate lesbian legal theory: this
article is but a beginning.
160. N. BROSSARD, supra note 2, at 136.
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